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THE FUTURE OF WORKPLACE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AFTER FISHER
REBECCA K. LEE†
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Fisher
v. University of Texas at Austin1 raises interesting questions
about its relevance for employment discrimination law and what
employers may be able to do to achieve employee diversity in the
workplace. Although Fisher dealt with the constitutionality of an
affirmative action program used in the university setting to
promote student body diversity, Fisher’s analysis would further
apply to race-conscious affirmative action efforts in the public
sector workplace2 and also offers considerations for private sector
employers to keep in mind when engaging in similar efforts.3 As
a relatively recent case that falls under the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on higher education affirmative action, Fisher
confirms that the Court’s earlier holdings in Regents of
University of California v. Bakke,4 Grutter v. Bollinger,5 and
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University of Texas at Austin.
1
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). This Article addresses
the Supreme Court’s first ruling in this case and was prepared for publication before
oral argument and the Court’s decision in Fisher II. See Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/fisher-vuniversity-of-texas-at-austin-2/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2015, 10:31 AM) [hereinafter
Fisher, SCOTUSBLOG] (showing that oral argument is scheduled for December 2015
and noting that the issue presented is “[w]hether the Fifth Circuit’s re-endorsement
of the University of Texas at Austin’s use of racial preferences in undergraduate
admissions decisions can be sustained under this Court’s decisions interpreting the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin”).
2
See infra Part I.
3
See infra Part II.
4
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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Gratz v. Bollinger6 serve as good precedent.7 Thus, it remains
unchanged that a state university has a compelling interest in
attaining a diverse student body for educational purposes that
could make it constitutionally permissible under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to use race as a factor in
admissions decisions.8 Fisher does not prohibit the use of race in
affirmative action programs per se by public universities and
would not prohibit the use of race in affirmative action programs
by public employers either. In clarifying the judiciary’s role in
reviewing governmental decisionmaking involving race, Fisher
closely examines the narrowly-tailored part of the strict scrutiny
standard under the Equal Protection Clause and explains that it
is for the courts to fully and independently assess whether the
program at issue is narrowly tailored based on the factual
record.9 In providing this clarification, Fisher provides further
guidance to public sector employers who engage in affirmative
action initiatives—guidance that may also be applicable to
private sector employers on this issue.
In addition, the Supreme Court in Schuette v. Coalition To
Defend Affirmative Action,10 which was decided after Fisher and
also touched upon higher education affirmative action, did not
change the constitutional permissibility of such initiatives.11
Schuette instead addressed a different question concerning
whether a state’s electorate may decide to ban race-conscious
decisionmaking by governmental actors, including state
universities.12 Fisher, then, remains intact in upholding the
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539 U.S. 306 (2003).
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
7
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013).
8
See id. at 2419.
9
Id. at 2419–21.
10
134 S. Ct 1623 (2014).
11
Id. at 1630 (“Before the Court addresses the question presented, it is
important to note what this case is not about. It is not about the constitutionality, or
the merits, of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education. . . . In Fisher,
the Court did not disturb the principle that the consideration of race in admissions is
permissible, provided that certain conditions are met. In this case, as in Fisher, that
principle is not challenged.”).
12
Id. (“The question here concerns not the permissibility of race-conscious
admissions policies under the Constitution but whether, and in what manner, voters
in the States may choose to prohibit the consideration of racial preferences in
governmental decisions, in particular with respect to school admissions.”). The state
constitutional amendment in Schuette adopted by voters in Michigan also prohibits
6
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constitutional validity of affirmative action admissions programs
carried out by state universities so long as they meet certain
requirements, and the relevance of its constitutional analysis
would likely extend to affirmative action programs implemented
by state employers to diversify their workforces. Although
private sector workplaces are governed by Title VII,13 and
accordingly are subject to Title VII’s requirements rather than
those under the United States Constitution,14 Fisher provides
lessons to keep in mind for private employers as well when
making hiring and promotion decisions involving race.
I.

WORKPLACE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION
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preferences in governmental decisions based on sex, color, ethnicity, or national
origin, in addition to race. Id. at 1629.
13
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012) (as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071). This Article focuses on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.
14
See infra Part II.
15
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417–19 (2013).
16
Id. at 2419–20.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 2419; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–12 (1978)
(Powell, J.) (plurality opinion).
19
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422–23 (Scalia, J., concurring); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 328–29 (2003).

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 106 Side A

As Fisher recounts, the Supreme Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence on affirmative action began with Bakke and
continued with Grutter.15 This body of case law explains that the
decisions of state entities, such as state universities and public
sector employers, if based on racial or ethnic origin, must pass
constitutional muster under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause.16 Specifically, a state program that takes into
account race must satisfy strict scrutiny, requiring that the
program advance a compelling governmental interest and is
narrowly tailored to meet this goal.17 Justice Powell, who wrote
the controlling opinion in Bakke, stated that a state university
has a compelling governmental interest in the educational
benefits that flow from having a diverse student body.18 Grutter,
which followed Bakke more than two decades later, affirmed that
attaining student body diversity is a compelling governmental
interest, as articulated by Justice Powell in Bakke.19 Both Bakke
and Grutter, like Fisher, concerned a state university’s use of
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race in making admissions decisions in order to diversify the
student body.20 Fisher, in referring to these cases, does not
reopen them but takes them as good precedent.21 Thus, it
remains settled that a state university’s interest in bringing
about racial diversity in its student body by factoring in race in
admissions would satisfy the compelling interest prong of the
strict scrutiny standard under the Equal Protection Clause.22
Although the Fisher Court, in keeping with the Court’s decisions
in Bakke and Grutter, found the asserted goal of the University of
Texas at Austin (“UT” or “the University”) of attaining student
body diversity a compelling state interest, the Court nonetheless
remanded the case, explaining that the reviewing court must
separately and fully assess whether the University’s plan was
narrowly tailored to meet its diversity objective,23 without
deference to the school’s assertions on this point.
A.

Applying Fisher, Wygant, and Grutter in Implementing
Affirmative Action Programs in the Public Sector Workplace

20
21
22
23

25
26
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24

Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411; Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2417.
Id. at 2419.
Id. at 2421–22.
Id. at 2421.
476 U.S. 267 (1986).
Id. at 269–70.
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Fisher and the Bakke and Grutter decisions it cites provide
support to also argue that the benefits of diversity may be
further recognized as a compelling state interest in the public
employment context. Although these cases arose in the higher
education context, with a focus on the educational benefits of
having diversity in the student body, the strict scrutiny standard
applies in any context where race is involved in governmental
decisionmaking.24
Thus, strict scrutiny would have to be
satisfied in the public sector workplace context as well if race was
used.
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,25 the Supreme
Court looked at the constitutionality of a public employer’s layoff
policy that protected certain minority employees over
nonminorities from layoffs as part of a collective bargaining
agreement with the teachers’ union.26
The Wygant Court
confirmed that strict scrutiny would have to be met because of
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the public employer’s use of race in implementing this policy.27
Under strict scrutiny, state actors must meet the following
two-pronged test when using race to make decisions: (1) whether
a compelling governmental interest supports the use of race and
(2) whether the method used by the state actor to achieve its
objective is narrowly tailored to meet the asserted goal.28 This
test applies whether the state actor is a state university or public
sector employer.
The plurality decision in Wygant explained that societal
discrimination and a role model approach to addressing societal
discrimination are not enough to warrant the use of race as part
of the layoff policy but that a need for remedial action could
justify the consideration of race in an affirmative action program
if the public employer has sufficient evidence to demonstrate that
it had engaged in prior discrimination.29 The petitioners in
Wygant were nonminority employees who were laid off, and they
sued under the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII, as well as
under other federal and state statutes.30 The Court stated:
Evidentiary support for the conclusion that remedial action is
warranted becomes crucial when the remedial program is
challenged in court by nonminority employees. . . . In such a
case, the trial court must make a factual determination that the
employer had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that
remedial action was necessary.31

27
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Id. at 273–74.
See id. at 274.
29
Id. at 274–76; see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter To Work:
Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 9 (2005) (“The Wygant plurality seemed to point toward a
‘remedial only’ theory of affirmative action in employment under the Constitution,
under which public employers were entitled to remedy only the underrepresentation
to which they—the particular agency, that is—had at least arguably contributed.
The ‘remedial only’ theory of affirmative action under the Constitution, and the
focus on particularized evidence of past discrimination, gained credence with the
Court’s decisions striking down minority business set-asides in public contracting in
Croson and Adarand.” (footnote omitted)).
30
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 272.
31
Id. at 277.
32
Id. at 277–78.
28
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Further, the Court stated that it is the plaintiff-employee’s
burden to demonstrate that an affirmative action plan is
unconstitutional.32 In Wygant, the Court did not settle the
question of whether the Jackson Board of Education (“the
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Id. at 278.
Id. at 282–83.
35
Id. at 283.
36
Id. at 283–84.
37
Id. at 274, 276, 283.
38
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 347 (2003). See generally Rebecca K. Lee, Implementing
Grutter’s Diversity Rationale: Diversity and Empathy in Leadership, 19 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 133, 141 (2011) [hereinafter Lee, Implementing Grutter’s
Diversity Rationale], cited and quoted in Brief for the State of California as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345), 2012 WL
3540401, at *9–10; Brief of Distinguished Alumni of the University of Texas at
Austin as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11345), 2012 WL 3418594, at *10; Rebecca K. Lee, Fisher v. University of Texas at
Austin: Promoting Full Judicial Review and Process in Applying Strict Scrutiny, 4
HOUS. L. REV. OFF REC. 33, 39–40 (2013) [hereinafter Lee, Promoting Full Judicial
Review and Process]. See, e.g., Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et
34
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Board”) had the required strong basis in evidence to support its
conclusion that remedial action was needed because it
determined, in any event, that the layoff policy did not satisfy the
narrowly tailored prong.33 The Court is particularly concerned
when an employer’s affirmative action policy involves a
race-conscious preferential system for layoffs—as opposed to
hiring—because layoffs exact a particular kind of injury on
innocent individuals that is more directly and deeply disruptive
to an employee’s seniority-based rights and expectations on the
job.34 Preferential hiring objectives, on the one hand, impose a
burden broadly on innocent individuals, whereas preferential
layoffs, on the other hand, impose a specific and concentrated
burden on only a small number of individuals.35 Thus, even if the
Board’s asserted goal could be justified as a permissible
governmental purpose, the Board’s layoff scheme was not
narrowly tailored to satisfy the requirements under the
Constitution.36
As Wygant illustrates, addressing societal discrimination
would not constitute a compelling governmental interest that
would justify a race-conscious affirmative action plan, and a
layoff policy based on race also would not satisfy the Equal
Protection Clause’s narrow tailoring mandate.37 But when it
comes to race-conscious hiring and diversity-related goals,
Grutter and Fisher help show that employers, including public
employers, may pursue an interest in the business and
organizational benefits that flow from having a diverse
workforce.38 Consider the amicus briefs relied on by the Court in
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Grutter—arguments put forth by various employers and
corporations in support of Justice Powell’s diversity rationale
emphasizing that our heterogeneous and international economy
needs leaders in the workplace with “exposure to widely diverse
people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”39 The amici in Grutter,
made up of public and private sector employers, recognized that
the benefits from exposure to diverse individuals extend beyond
school and into the workforce.40 Diversity in the workplace is
needed for organizations and businesses to operate competitively
and effectively and to create a work setting that is “inclusive,
comfortable, and reflective of the multicultural communities in
which [businesses do] business.”41 Because many employers seek
to hire graduates from top schools, employers have a strong
interest in taking note of the population of students who get
admitted
into
our
nation’s
selective
colleges
and
universities—students who then make up the pool of college
graduates from which employers recruit their employees.42 To
draw upon the full range of talent available and to be competitive
in our diverse society and economy, employers commonly look to
recruit diverse, qualified college graduates with wide-ranging
experiences and knowledge.43
As part of its judicial review, it is proper for a court to give
some deference to a university’s expertise and judgment that
diversity is indispensable to its pedagogical mission.44 The

04/08/2016 13:04:55
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al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241,
02-516), 2003 WL 1787554, at *1, *5; Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American
Businesses in Support of Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516),
2003 WL 399056, at *2, *5–6.
39
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330; see, e.g., Brief of Exxon Mobil Corp. as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516),
2003 WL 554411, at *4; Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses, supra note 38, at
*2; Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL 399096, at *12; Brief of Amici
Curiae Massachusetts Institute of Technology, et al. in Support of Respondents,
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL 367215, at *9.
40
See, e.g., Brief of Exxon Mobil Corp., supra note 39, at *4; Brief of General
Motors Corp., supra note 38, at *6; see also Estlund, supra note 29, at 19–20.
41
Brief of Exxon Mobil Corp., supra note 39, at *1, *3–4.
42
See Brief of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and the LCCR
Education Fund as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306
(Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL 536770, at *20; Lee, Implementing Grutter’s
Diversity Rationale, supra note 38, at 141–42.
43
See, e.g., Brief of Exxon Mobil Corp., supra note 39, at *3–4.
44
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013); Grutter,
539 U.S. at 328–29.
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Supreme Court recognizes that a university is engaged in the
learning enterprise and thus seeks a diverse student body to
foster a better learning environment.45
In looking at the
workplace context, however, there is admittedly a difference
between the mission of a university and that of an employer;46
accordingly, employers cannot claim to have the same kind of
educational mission.47 But employers have asserted that a
diverse workforce is needed to better inform a given employer’s
service or product and to better take into account the realities of
the diverse marketplace.48
Moreover, both employers and
universities seek to cultivate and produce leaders.49
Consequently, employers as well as universities can have
diversity-related missions, and thus public employers may be
able to make an analogous argument that they have a compelling
interest in the benefits that come with having a diverse
workforce. Relying on Fisher and Grutter for support, public
employers may be able to successfully meet the compelling
interest prong of the strict scrutiny standard with respect to a
race-conscious hiring or promotion process.50 And based on their
particular experiences and organizational judgment, employers
are in the best position to know whether diversity is essential for
their respective institutional missions. Just as a university’s
experience and expert judgment that diversity is crucial for its
educational mission receives some judicial deference, an
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See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328–30.
See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
47
See Estlund, supra note 29, at 21.
48
See, e.g., Brief of General Motors Corp., supra note 39, at *6 (“Immersion in a
multiracial academic environment enhances students’ knowledge of different
cultures and their understanding of perspectives that are influenced by race. That
augmented understanding in turn prepares students, upon graduation, to work
cooperatively in multiracial environments and to serve multiracial clienteles.”); Brief
of Exxon Mobil Corp., supra note 39, at *8–9 (“A diverse workforce not only
generates varied perspectives, which improve decision-making, increase
productivity, and help companies understand the different environments in which
business is conducted today, but also contributes to a positive work environment and
decreasing incidents of discrimination.”).
49
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312–13 (1978); see also
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330–32.
50
See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 n.11 (1986) (stating
that the earlier “ ‘school admission’ cases . . . involve the same basic concepts as
cases involving hiring goals”). Although these cases predate Grutter and Fisher, they
still involve decision-making that took into account race by a state university. See id.
46
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51
See Estlund, supra note 29, at 33 (“Courts that follow the logic of Grutter into
the public sector workplace might accord deference toward employers’ institutional
justifications for preferences that in fact tend to diversify and integrate
predominantly white workplaces. Such deference would be grounded not in any
special constitutional privilege of employers to define their own mission or needs,
but in the ordinary deference that government employers are accorded in
determining what their institutional mission and needs require.”).
52
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419–20 (2013).
53
Id. at 2420.
54
See id.
55
See id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003)).
56
See id. at 2420–21.

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 109 Side A

employer’s professional and organizational judgment that
diversity is essential for its institutional mission should be given
some judicial deference.51
If it can be established that the goal of attaining workforce
diversity is a compelling state interest, then the reviewing court
would need to independently determine whether the employer’s
selection process is narrowly tailored to meet this asserted goal,
as explained in Fisher respecting the narrowly-tailored
requirement under strict scrutiny.52 That is, a court would need
to examine whether an employer’s hiring process is
individualized and flexible so that it considers the applicant’s
race or ethnicity as one of many relevant factors and not as the
determinative factor.53 A court must also determine whether the
employer could have feasibly implemented an alternative hiring
process without the use of race;54 this does not mean, however,
that an employer would have had to fully explore every possible
alternative that would have avoided the use of race, but instead
that an employer should have fully considered all feasible
race-neutral options.55 It seems a court could also appropriately
note an employer’s experience and knowledge in deciding to use
or not use particular hiring approaches, but the court in its
examination must rely on the evidence presented by the
employer on this question without simply deferring to an
employer’s good-faith assertion that it looked at all race-neutral
options.56
If deference were given to a public sector employer as to
whether it has a compelling interest in having workforce
diversity, which is the first part of the strict scrutiny standard,
then it arguably makes sense to require the employer to present
sufficient evidence to meet the second part of the strict scrutiny
standard in demonstrating its need for a hiring process that
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57
See Lee, Promoting Full Judicial Review and Process, supra note 38, at 35, 37
(making a similar point regarding judicial review of a university’s race-conscious
admissions program under strict scrutiny).
58
See id. at 35.
59
See id. at 37.

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 109 Side B

considers race. Judicial review would lose its specific purpose if
the employer were to receive deference on both parts of the strict
scrutiny test.57 For the court to fully carry out its judicial review
under strict scrutiny, the court should undertake a separate and
independent review to ensure that any selection process by the
employer involving the use of race is not too broad for the
purpose of meeting the asserted goal. Solely or overly relying on
the governmental actor’s arguments in meeting the narrow
tailoring requirement would give the governmental party the
discretion to both implement its chosen selection process and
confirm its proper use. If judicial deference is given in one part
of the strict scrutiny analysis, then the court ought to play a
more active role in reviewing the other part in order for there to
be a proper review of the state actor’s decisions.58
However, this does not, and should not, mean that a court
should ignore the employer’s experience and particular
familiarity with the use of certain selection processes in its
industry; a court can and should take note of this. But having
the court carefully perform its evidence-based review recognizes
the court’s important role in terms of judicial process,
particularly under strict scrutiny where race is concerned. As a
matter of procedural consistency when assessing the
constitutionality of governmental action, a court should conduct
an independent judicial review even when the state program
appears to have been thoroughly considered and pursued in good
faith.59 But judicial review should make it possible for a public
employer to be able to meet its diversity-related workplace goals
so long as it can present sufficient evidence to demonstrate to the
court that its hiring or selection process is narrowly tailored to
achieve the workplace and business benefits of diversity.
The evidentiary requirement should be a realistic and not
impossible standard to meet, keeping in mind that state
employers, in meeting this burden, may likely have to expend
greater administrative costs and effort to collect and maintain
the information. At the same time, public employers may, in any
event, already keep track of this information and certainly

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 110 Side A

04/08/2016 13:04:55

FINAL_LEE.DOC

2015]

3/23/16 11:17 PM

FUTURE OF WORKPLACE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

607

should do so to make sure that their hiring or selection processes
are specifically tailored to meet their asserted objectives. Fisher
just requires that this evidence be presented for the reviewing
court to examine.60
B.

Fisher on Remand

60
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Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421.
Id. at 2417, 2421.
62
See generally id.
63
Appellees’ Statement Concerning Further Proceedings on Remand at 1–2,
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher on remand), 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014)
(No. 09-50822), available at http://lgdata.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/docs/
971/812884/Appellees__Statement_Concerning_Further_Proceedings_on_Remand.pd
f; Supplemental Brief for Appellees at 5–6, Fisher on remand, 758 F.3d 633 (No. 0950822), available at https://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/2013-10-25-UT-Fis
her.Supp.Br.pdf.
64
Fisher on remand, 758 F.3d at 640–42.
61
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Because Fisher was decided in the lower courts on summary
judgment before reaching the Supreme Court, the record was
developed as part of the summary judgment proceedings and not
as part of any trial.61 The Supreme Court did not rule on
whether the current summary judgment record was sufficient to
demonstrate the constitutionality of the admissions policy at
issue; instead, it remanded the case after further explaining the
court’s role in conducting a proper judicial review under strict
scrutiny and clarifying the evidentiary requirements needed for
such a review.62 On the evidentiary question back in the Fifth
Circuit on remand, the University stated that the record from its
summary judgment motion should be sufficient to meet the
constitutional standard set forth by the Supreme Court.
Nonetheless, the University requested that the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit send the case back down so
that the district court could rehear the case first and allow for
further factual presentation.63 After more briefing and oral
argument, the Fifth Circuit denied the University’s motion for
remand on the procedural issue, explaining that although it had
the discretion to remand the case to the district court, doing so
was not necessary for the court to complete its review and would
yield no concrete benefit.64 Circuit Judge Patrick Higginbotham,
writing the majority opinion, which was joined by Circuit Judge
Carolyn King, stated that the existing record was sufficient since
there were no new factual issues in need of resolution and
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Id. at 641–42.
Id. at 643–44.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 645.
Id. at 645–46.
Id. at 645.
Id. at 647–48.
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because the reviewing court’s error that the Supreme Court
noted was made by both the appellate court and the district court
in the same way.65
Turning to the merits of the case, the majority stated that
under the proper strict scrutiny standard, it had a duty to
independently evaluate, based on the evidence, whether the
school’s method of attaining student body diversity was narrowly
tailored to meet its asserted diversity goal.66 To satisfy the
narrow tailoring requirement, the reviewing court must find that
it is necessary for a university to use race for it to achieve the
pedagogical benefits that flow from student diversity and that no
workable race-neutral alternatives would bring about these
benefits.67 In conducting its assessment, the court cannot defer
to the school on whether the means selected to achieve the
school’s stated purpose is narrowly tailored to achieve that
purpose, but the court can take note of the university’s
experience and expert knowledge in independently evaluating
the school’s admission process.68
The Fifth Circuit perused the record concerning UT’s use of
its Top Ten Percent Plan (“Percent Plan”), which gave Texas
students who graduate in the top ten percent of their high school
class automatic admission to any public university in Texas.69
This race-neutral method was used to select over eighty percent
of its Texas students.70 The University also used, in conjunction
with this admissions program, an individualized, race-conscious
holistic review to select the small remaining percentage of the
entering class.71 The court noted that UT additionally engaged in
a variety of race-neutral outreach and scholarship programs to
facilitate
interaction
with
underrepresented
student
populations.72 In its independent assessment, the Fifth Circuit
found that the school used a range of race-neutral
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methods to try to grow minority enrollment and admitted the
vast majority of its students through the race-neutral Percent
Plan.73
Moreover, the court found that the University’s use of a
holistic review process, which considered the race of the
applicants as one factor among many, served to complement the
pool of students admitted through the Percent Plan.74 The
race-neutral Percent Plan, by looking at only one measure of
achievement, failed to bring in students with diverse
accomplishments, experiences, and backgrounds that would
enrich the class profile but who did not make the rigid ten
percent cut-off.75 The holistic review thus supplemented and
complemented the Percent Plan by looking at a spectrum of
characteristics and contributions that applicants had to
offer.76 Further, the holistic review was implemented as a highly
individualized and highly competitive review process, given the
small percentage of seats filled outside the Percent Plan, and did
not operate as a quota system or as an unlimited program in
terms of time.77 In painstakingly examining all of these aspects
of UT’s admissions program, the court held that the school’s
means for achieving its goal of student body diversity was
narrowly tailored and thus strict scrutiny was satisfied.78 As a
result, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the University.79
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Id. at 649.
Id. at 653.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 647, 654.
78
Id. at 637, 659.
79
Id. at 637, 660. In July 2014, Plaintiff Abigail Fisher submitted a petition for
rehearing en banc in the Fifth Circuit, and the court of appeals denied the petition.
Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 1, Fisher on remand, 758 F.3d 633 (No. 09-50822),
available at http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/7.29.14.Fisher.Petition.for.Re
hearing.En.Banc.pdf; Order Denying Rehearing En Banc, Fisher on remand, 758
F.3d (No. 09-50822), available at http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/
11.12.2014.Rehearing.En.Banc.DENIED.pdf. In February 2015, the plaintiff filed a
writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, and on June 29, 2015, the Supreme
Court agreed to hear the case during its 2015–16 term. Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 14-981 (U.S. argued Dec. 9, 2015),
2015 WL 603513; Fisher, SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 1.
74
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Circuit Judge Emilio Garza wrote a dissenting opinion, in
which he questioned what the University meant when it used the
term “critical mass” of student diversity.80 In his view, the school
framed its diversity goal as achieving a critical mass but was
unable to objectively define this term in order to enable the court
to do its separate assessment.81 Because Judge Garza found that
the school was unable to satisfactorily define critical mass and
what it requires, he did not think the court could make an
independent determination as to whether the school’s
race-conscious means of achieving this critical mass were
narrowly tailored.82 The majority, however, did not find fault
with the University’s use of this term because it understood that
critical mass could not be defined simply as a numerical
goal.83 The majority demonstrated a fuller and more
contextualized understanding of critical mass in trying to achieve
student body diversity, stating:
Critical mass, the tipping point of diversity, has no fixed upper
bound of universal application, nor is it the minimum threshold
at which minority students do not feel isolated or like
spokespersons for their race. Grutter defines critical mass by
reference to a broader view of diversity rather than by the
achievement of a certain quota of minority students. Here, UT
Austin has demonstrated a permissible goal of achieving the
educational benefits of diversity within that university’s distinct
mission, not seeking a percentage of minority students that
reaches some arbitrary size.84

Electoral Review Under Schuette

In Schuette, the Supreme Court’s most recent decision on
affirmative action, the Court did not disturb the strict scrutiny
analysis for race-conscious decisionmaking. Rather, the Court
addressed a different issue concerning the electoral process and
state affirmative action programs.
Schuette allows for
limitations on the ability of state actors to use affirmative action
if the restrictions are made part of a state’s constitution through

80
81

83
84
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82

Fisher on remand, 758 F.3d at 661–62 (Garza, J., dissenting).
Id. at 661, 666.
Id. at 666.
Id. at 654 (majority opinion).
Id. at 656.
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voter enactment or amendment.85 Schuette thus presented
questions concerning the legislative process at the state level on
whether state actors can consider race in making decisions.
But this case, in allowing a state’s voters to weigh in on
whether a state actor can consider race in making decisions, even
for constitutionally valid programs such as the University of
Michigan’s revised college admissions process,86 arguably permits
another type of review—what can be called an “electoral
review”—of a public actor’s affirmative action program, in
addition to the already required judicial review of such programs.
This electoral review exists as another layer of review by making
it possible for a state’s electorate to review, and approve or reject,
a governmental actor’s race-conscious decisionmaking.87 If voters
are permitted to approve or reject an affirmative action plan
after public debate via electoral review, as seen in
Schuette,88 then state actors should be further prepared to
provide information to the public at large concerning their
race-conscious affirmative action programs in the event that the
use of race in state decisions is brought up for a public vote.
Thus, sufficient evidence to show why and how race is being
considered is relevant and central for independent judicial review
and any potential electoral review.
II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION UNDER TITLE VII
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85
Schuette v. Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1635, 1638
(2014).
86
Id. at 1638.
87
See id. at 1629 (“After a statewide debate on the question of racial preferences
in the context of governmental decisionmaking, the voters, in 2006, adopted an
amendment to the State Constitution prohibiting state and other governmental
entities in Michigan from granting certain preferences, including race-based
preferences, in a wide range of actions and decisions.”).
88
See id.
89
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203–04 (1979).
90
See id. at 204–06; Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 641–42 (1987).
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As for either a private-sector or public-sector employer’s use
of race as part of a voluntary affirmative action plan under Title
VII, the statutory language of Title VII does not prohibit
voluntary affirmative action efforts.89 On the contrary, the
Supreme Court has ruled that the statute allows voluntary
affirmative action to address racial or gender imbalances.90 In
enacting Title VII, Congress sought to avoid unnecessary federal
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regulation of private businesses.91 Further, Title VII was enacted
under Congress’s commerce power to govern private-sector actors
and was not meant to incorporate the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment.92 Title VII thus has been interpreted to
allow for an employer’s exercise of business judgment in meeting
the statute’s antidiscrimination goals. If an employer’s business
judgment is that diversity is essential to its institutional mission,
then this should receive some judicial deference under Title VII.
Although business necessity cannot be used as a defense to a
charge of intentional discrimination,93 using business necessity
would be permissible in setting forth a valid affirmative action
plan because asserting the existence of a lawful affirmative
action plan is not an affirmative defense but simply does not
amount to action that violates Title VII.94
A.

Applying Weber and Johnson in Implementing Workplace
Affirmative Action

The Supreme Court first addressed affirmative action under
Title VII in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber95 and
Johnson v. Santa Clara Transportation Agency;96 these cases
remain the relevant precedent for private and public employers
under Title VII. In Weber, the private employer implemented a
voluntary affirmative action plan, which was negotiated with the
91

Weber, 443 U.S. at 206–07.
Id. at 206 n.6.
93
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2) (2012); Estlund, supra note
29, at 35.
94
See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626–27 (“As a preliminary matter, we note that
petitioner bears the burden of establishing the invalidity of the Agency’s Plan. Only
last Term, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, we held that ‘[t]he ultimate
burden remains with the employees to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of an
affirmative-action program,’ and we see no basis for a different rule regarding a
plan’s alleged violation of Title VII. This case also fits readily within the analytical
framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. Once a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case that race or sex has been taken into account in an
employer’s employment decision, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a
nondiscriminatory rationale for its decision. The existence of an affirmative action
plan provides such a rationale. If such a plan is articulated as the basis for the
employer’s decision, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s
justification is pretextual and the plan is invalid. . . . [R]eliance on an affirmative
action plan is to be treated as an affirmative defense requiring the employer to carry
the burden of proving the validity of the plan. The burden of proving its invalidity
remains on the plaintiff.” (citation omitted)).
95
443 U.S. 193.
96
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 619.
92
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Weber, 443 U.S. at 197–99.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 199–200.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 208 (citation omitted).
Id.
See id. at 208–09.
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 616–17 (1987).
Id. at 619.
Id. at 620–21.
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union, that reserved for black employees fifty percent of open
positions in newly-created training programs until the
percentage of skilled black craftworkers approached the
percentage of blacks in the local labor force.97 Before this plan
was implemented, craftworker jobs were filled with employees
who had craft experience, commonly gained through an
apprentice system that historically had excluded blacks.98 Brian
Weber, an unskilled white worker, sued under Title VII because
black workers with less seniority than he had were accepted into
the craft training program.99 The Supreme Court upheld the
employer’s voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plan
under Title VII.100
As the Court explained, this affirmative action plan was
permissible because “the plan [did] not unnecessarily trammel
the interests of the white employees [and did] not require the
discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black
hirees. Nor [did] the plan create an absolute bar to the
advancement of white employees.”101 “Moreover, the plan [was] a
temporary measure.”102
An employer’s use of a voluntary,
race-conscious affirmative action plan, if it meets these
requirements, is not discrimination under Title VII. 103
Johnson built on Weber’s analysis regarding the validity of
an employer’s voluntary affirmative action plan under Title VII
and involved a gender-conscious plan.104 In Johnson, a county
employer unilaterally implemented an Affirmative Action Plan
(“Plan”) that applied to employee promotions.105 The employer
was allowed to take gender into account as a factor when making
promotion decisions within a traditionally segregated job
category where women were greatly underrepresented.106 In its
Plan, the employer noted that women were underrepresented in
the agency as a whole and in particular in five of seven job
categories, and that the agency’s female workers were clustered
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Id. at 621.
Id. at 621–22.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 619.
Id.
Id. at 623.
Id. at 623–24.
Id. at 624.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 624–25.
See id. at 627–28, 630–39, 642.
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largely in clerical and office positions which were traditionally
occupied by women.107 The county employer’s long-term objective
was to attain a workforce whose composition mirrored the
proportion of minorities and women in the surrounding area’s
labor force.108 The Plan advised creating short-term goals that
would be updated yearly and used as a practical guide in making
employment decisions at the agency.109
The plaintiff, Paul Johnson, was a male employee who
applied for a promotion to become a road dispatcher.110 Diane
Joyce, a female employee who also applied for this position, was
For this road
promoted pursuant to the agency’s Plan.111
dispatcher position, Johnson and Joyce, along with seven other
applicants, were found to be qualified for the job, and they each
were given an interview with a two-person board.112 Seven of the
applicants, again including Johnson and Joyce, “were certified as
eligible for selection by the appointing authority.”113 Three
agency supervisors completed a second interview round, and they
recommended that Johnson be promoted.114 Before this second
interview, Joyce had contacted the county’s Affirmative Action
Office due to a concern that her application would not receive
serious consideration.115 Consequently, the Affirmative Action
Office reached out to the agency’s Affirmative Action Coordinator
who recommended to the agency’s director that Joyce be
promoted.116 There were no skilled female craftworkers in the
agency at the time, and a woman had never been employed as a
road dispatcher at the agency.117 The director ultimately decided
to promote Joyce to road dispatcher.118
The Court found the agency’s Plan to be permissible under
Title VII, relying on Weber as the guiding precedent.119 The
Court first considered whether there was a manifest imbalance
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Id. at 631–32.
Id. at 634, 636–37.
Id. at 637–38.
Id. at 638.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 639–40.
Id.
Id. at 626.
Id.
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in skilled craft positions, leading to the underrepresentation of
women in a traditionally segregated job category that would
justify using gender as a factor in assessing applicants for these
jobs.120 According to the Court, gender was properly taken into
account in order to correct the underrepresentation of women in
skilled craft jobs.121 Next, the Court examined whether the Plan
“unnecessarily trammeled the rights of male employees or
created an absolute bar to their advancement.”122 Because the
Plan did not set aside positions exclusively for women and
instead authorized the consideration of gender as one of many
factors when evaluating applicants, the Plan required that all
qualified female applicants be evaluated against all other
qualified applicants for these skilled craft jobs.123 The Court
further noted that Johnson, the male petitioner, was not entitled
in an absolute sense to the promotion he sought since he was one
of seven applicants who were deemed qualified and eligible for
the position.124 Also, Johnson continued to have his job with the
county employer and was eligible to apply for other advancement
opportunities.125
For an affirmative action plan to be permissible under Title
VII, the plan also must be temporary—that is, the plan must be
intended to eliminate manifest racial or gender imbalance, but
not to maintain a racial or gender balance.126 The Plan at issue
satisfied this requirement by taking realistic, incremental steps
to eliminate gender underrepresentation and stating a goal of
attaining a balanced workforce.127
The Court in Johnson also clarified that under either Title
VII or the Constitution, the petitioner bears the burden of
establishing that the employer’s affirmative action plan is
invalid.128 If the plaintiff can prove this, then the plan would
amount to a formal policy of discrimination and, as such, would
violate Title VII as well as the Equal Protection Clause.129 But,
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as seen through the constitutional cases and Title VII cases on
the validity of employer plans, Title VII takes a more flexible
approach to affirmative action than does the Constitution.
B.

Lessons from Ricci, Fisher, and the 1991 Civil Rights Act

The standard leaves ample room for employers’ voluntary
compliance efforts, which are essential to the statutory scheme
and to Congress’s efforts to eradicate workplace discrimination.
And the standard appropriately constrains employers’ discretion
in making race-based decisions: It limits that discretion to cases
in which there is a strong basis in evidence of disparate-impact
liability, but it is not so restrictive that it allows employers to
act only when there is a provable, actual violation. 136
130
131
132
133

135
136
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557 U.S. 557 (2009).
Id. at 562.
Id.
Id. at 583–85.
Id. at 583.
Id.
Id.
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In Ricci v. DeStefano,130 a 2009 Supreme Court case, the
Court took a notable turn in importing a constitutional test into
its analysis under Title VII, although the case did not deal with
affirmative
action
but
with
disparate-treatment
and
disparate-impact discrimination.131 Specifically, Ricci involved
the discarding of test results normally used to make promotion
decisions in the city’s firefighting department by a city employer
because of a statistical racial disparity in the results after the
test was given.132 Ricci held that the city’s action in discarding
the test results was race-based and that under Title VII such
race-based action is prohibited unless the city could show a
strong basis in evidence that had it not taken this action it would
have been liable for disparate-impact discrimination.133
Although this strong-basis-in-evidence test had previously
only been used in the constitutional context to assess claims of
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme
Court explained that it should be further employed in the Title
VII context because this standard would ensure that the statute’s
disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions are both
enforced.134 This standard would permit an infringement on one
provision in order to uphold the other only in certain limited
situations.135 According to the Court:
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By extending the applicability of this constitutional standard
to Title VII, the Ricci Court moved toward some convergence
between the constitutional and statutory approaches, at least
when evaluating the statute’s disparate-treatment and
disparate-impact provisions and created a higher evidentiary
burden under Title VII. But Ricci was not an affirmative action
case, and Johnson, which dealt with affirmative action under
Title VII, clearly held that Title VII should not be interpreted to
incorporate the commands of the Constitution.137 Ricci and
Fisher indicate, however, that the Supreme Court is looking for
strong evidentiary support when it reviews decisions involving
race, whether under Title VII or the Constitution.
Further, Title VII was amended by the 1991 Civil Rights Act
(“the 1991 Act”),138 which added section 116139 as an amendment
to Title VII, and is the only part of the statute that expressly
refers to affirmative action,140 stating, “Nothing in the
amendments made by this title shall be construed to affect
court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation
agreements, that are in accordance with the law.”141 This
statement can be interpreted to mean that the 1991 Act, in
amending Title VII, does not affect affirmative action that is in
accordance with Title VII or any other law. In enacting the 1991
amendments to Title VII, Congress expressly rejected the
Supreme Court’s decision in an earlier Title VII case but did not
take any action to modify or reject the Supreme Court’s rulings
in Weber and Johnson.142 In fact, section 116 appears to preserve
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137
Id. at 563; Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 627 n.6 (1987). But see
generally Sachin S. Pandya, Detecting the Stealth Erosion of Precedent: Affirmative
Action After Ricci, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 285 (2010) (arguing that the
Supreme Court in Ricci wrote the decision in a way designed to intentionally erode
Weber and Johnson in order to advance an interpretation of Title VII that would
allow affirmative action plans only in situations where the employer sought to
remedy its own actual or arguable prior discrimination).
138
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
139
Id. § 116, 105 Stat. at 1079; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
140
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 116, 105 Stat. at 1079.
141
Id.
142
Id. §§ 2–3, 105 Stat. at 1071. (“The Congress finds that . . . the decision of the
Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) has
weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections [and]
legislation is necessary to provide additional protections against unlawful
discrimination in employment. . . . The purposes of this Act are . . . to codify the
concepts of ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’ enunciated by the Supreme Court in
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the legal force of those cases by stating that nothing in the 1991
Act affects affirmative action plans that are in accordance with
these cases, and section 116 makes no changes to the Court’s
holdings.143 Thus, Weber and Johnson continue to serve as the
applicable precedent for affirmative action cases under Title VII.
But to the extent that the Supreme Court’s approach to
affirmative action under Title VII becomes stricter after Ricci
and Fisher, and potentially more aligned with the constitutional
test, public and private employers who wish to implement
race-conscious or gender-conscious affirmative action plans for
hiring and promotion decisions would be well advised to model
their selection processes based on those in not just Weber and
Johnson, but also the processes used in Grutter and Fisher.
Private sector employers who implement affirmative action
policies should be prepared to satisfy the standards set out in
Weber and Johnson as well as prepared to potentially have to
satisfy something closer to the strict scrutiny standard under
Grutter and Fisher. In other words, a reviewing court may need
to independently assess the validity of the program in the event
that the Supreme Court also moves toward a more rigorous
evidentiary assessment of affirmative action programs by private
sector employers.
CONCLUSION
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Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court
decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).”).
143
In fact, in Johnson the Supreme Court noted the lack of congressional
reaction to Weber:
As Justice Blackmun said in his concurrence in Weber, “[I]f the Court has
misperceived the political will, it has the assurance that because the
question is statutory Congress may set a different course if it so chooses.”
Congress has not amended [Title VII] to reject our construction [in Weber],
nor have any such amendments even been proposed, and we therefore may
assume that our interpretation was correct.
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987) (first alteration in original)
(citation omitted); see also Michael J. Zimmer, Taxman: Affirmative Action Dodges
Five Bullets, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 229, 233–35 (1998).
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The Supreme Court’s decision on race-conscious affirmative
action in Fisher, along with the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Fisher on
remand, importantly preserves the validity of affirmative action
programs in state decisionmaking if the programs meet certain
criteria under strict scrutiny and satisfy full judicial review.
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Although Fisher arose in the higher education context,144 its
application extends to the public setting more generally and thus
would also apply to the public sector workplace under the
Constitution, making it permissible for public sector employers to
use race-conscious affirmative action in hiring and promoting
employees. The approach taken in Fisher also provides relevant
considerations for private sector employers who pursue
affirmative action under Title VII, even if indirectly. Private
sector employers can still look to Weber and Johnson in
proceeding with affirmative action programs that consider race
or gender; moreover, to further bolster their use of race in the
wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Fisher and Grutter,
they would be wise to also take note of the Court’s recent views
concerning the evidentiary requirements needed to uphold such
programs in the public sector.
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